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Abstract. In inter-enterprise collaboration, autonomic services from
different organizations must independently determine which other ser-
vices they can rely on. Reputation-based trust management in the Pi-
larcos open service ecosystem combines shared experience information
on the actors’ past behaviour and the decision context to estimate the
risks of a collaboration. The trust decision process is semi-automatic,
with selected decisions forwarded to a human user. A particularly inter-
esting feature of the decision process is incongruity, that is, unexpected
changes in service performance. In the classical example, a previously
well-behaved service turns malicious to cash in its good reputation as ill-
gained monetary profit. If the reputation system swiftly reacts to such
changes, it protects its user more efficiently and deters misbehaviour.
We present a new model for detecting and reacting to incongruities in a
reputation-based trust management system. The model is based on the
concept of reputation epochs, dividing an actor’s reputation into periods
of internally consistent behaviour. In contrast to earlier approaches, this
model provides the necessary flexibility for the trust management system
to adjust to constantly changing business situations.
1 Introduction
In inter-enterprise collaboration, services from different organizational domains
join together to fulfil a mutual goal. In the open service ecosystem, the services
are autonomous and there is no centralized control on the collaboration process.
Each service must independently determine which other services it can rely on,
both in the sense of making its own resources available, and in expecting that
the other collaborators do their part in realizing the joint goal. To support
these decisions, it collects experience information on the past performance of
other services, both first-hand and shared by other actors in the ecosystem. This
experience information forms the reputation of a service. Due to the decentralized
nature of open service ecosystems, reputation is subjective to the actor who has
collected and analyzed the information; it is not globally agreed upon by all.
Reputation-based trust management supports making trust decisions on dif-
ferent services, in the context of a given collaboration and possibly a specific set
of transactions within it. The decision process consists of two parts [6]: First,
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to estimate the risks of a positive decision. Second, this estimate is compared to
a risk tolerance policy for the particular type of decision in order to determine
the outcome: yes, proceed; no, withdraw; or, if the result falls on a gray area
between the two, forward the decision to a human user.
A semi-automatic decision process is necessary due to the complex and con-
stantly changing business environment. Automation is perfect for handling rou-
tine cases, which we expect to form the majority of decisions. Unforeseen situa-
tions and uncertainty, on the other hand, cannot be comprehensively dealt with
by exact rules, and are left for a human user to resolve. Due to this division, the
trust management system must be able to detect when a decision is not routine.
Incongruities, i.e. sudden changes in service performance, are a challenge
for the automated decision process. In the classical example, a previously well-
behaved service turns malicious to cash in its good reputation as ill-gained mon-
etary profit. As reputation largely depends on shared experiences, information
sources can also change their behaviour, and begin to spread misinformation.
We require a reputation system to swiftly react to such changes, both to
limit the losses of the decision-maker service, and to discourage misbehaviour
by minimizing the gains from it. At the same time, an honest actor’s reputation
should not be irreparably tarnished due to a momentary outage or dishonest
negative feedback. These conflicting requirements are impossible to meet with a
single universal, or fixed, set of rules; instead, reputation-based trust manage-
ment systems must have support for appropriately handling incongruity through
policies that can be configured — and re-configured — according to the business
situation.
This paper presents a new model for detecting and reacting to incongruities
in a reputation-based trust management system. We build on our existing Pilar-
cos trust management system, presented in earlier work [7]. Our model separates
reputation analysis policies from trust decision policies in order to be able to use
the same reputation information in a variety of decision-making contexts. Sim-
ilarly, we separate the detection of behaviour changes from how their existence
should affect upcoming trust decisions.
The model is based on the novel concept of reputation epochs, periods of
internally consistent behaviour. A detected change in the behaviour pattern
causes a change of reputation epoch. To illustrate the concept, we compare a
few simple algorithms for identifying a pattern and detecting when it is broken.
For this, we draw inspiration from the field of anomaly detection. The power of
the concept goes beyond our examples, however, and it provides unprecedented
flexibility for handling incongruity in reputation evolution.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the problem context and
related work, Section 3 presents reputation epochs, and evaluates the costs and
benefits of introducing them. Section 4 presents three example epoch detection
policies for use in three different scenarios, and Section 5 presents simulation re-
sults on how the policies behave in practice for each scenario. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
32 Background
In this section, we first introduce the context in which we utilize reputation
flows to for trust management in Pilarcos. We then present related work on the
topic of adjusting to changes and uncertainty in reputation flows, and relate our
proposal to the existing research.
2.1 Reputation-based trust management in Pilarcos
The reputation-based trust management system we propose has been imple-
mented as a part of the Pilarcos open service ecosystem [5]. Besides trust manage-
ment, the Pilarcos collaboration management tools provide automated support
for setting up collaborations, including interoperability checking and contract
negotiation, and runtime monitoring, including contract breach detection and
recovery. For signing contracts, actors are required to have persistent identities.
The trust management process can be divided into two parts: the trust deci-
sions, and the evolution process of the reputation information. Both are governed
by their own, separate policies; this separation is necessary in order to be able
to use the once-collected reputation information in different decision contexts.
A trust decision is triggered at specific points of the collaboration process,
whenever resources are being committed and risk evaluation is needed. To eval-
uate the risk of proceeding with the collaboration, we predict the outcome it
would have on different assets based on previous experiences, stored in reputa-
tion information [6]. For the purposes of this paper, we only consider the effects
on the monetary asset. These effects are divided into a scale of minor or major,
positive or negative effects on the asset, no effect, and unknown effect for cases
when the outcome cannot be observed for all assets.
To complete the trust decision, the risk estimate is compared to a risk toler-
ance policy, which essentially categorizes the risk into three options: acceptable
(proceed with the collaboration), unacceptable (withdraw) or uncertain (forward
the decision to a human user). The risk tolerance policy defines a minimum level
of certainty required for an automated decision; certainty is influenced by a set
of factors, measuring the amount and quality of reputation information used in
the decision. A central measure of the quality of the information is its credibil-
ity — reputation based on local observations is ultimately credible, while the
credibility of external reputation information varies [6, 8].
The evolution of reputation information allows the system to adjust to changes
in partner behaviour. New experiences from collaborations are stored into the
system from two kinds of sources: a flow of first-hand experiences from local mon-
itors, observing parameters such as quality of service and detecting any breaches
of contract, and flows of external experiences, reported by other actors through
reputation networks. A reputation network is the combination of a reputation
system, defining the processes of dissemination, calculation and evolution of rep-
utation scores, and the actors using it. We expect that third-party reputation
information relevant to a specific service will be scattered over a number of dif-
ferent reputation networks. The local trust management system will merge the
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it is and how credible the source is considered to be.
The epoch detection process we are proposing will take place after reputation
flows from different networks have been analyzed and merged into a single exter-
nal reputation flow, and compared to the flow of local experiences. The ordering
is significant in that an epoch change must be based on credible information;
errors should be minimized to avoid situations where outlier experiences trigger
unnecessary epoch changes. An epoch change affects both local and external
reputation streams simultaneously.
2.2 Related work on changes and uncertainty in reputation flows
While there exists a notable body of research on reputation systems [8, 2], the
evolution of reputation remains a largely uncharted area. A typical approach to
addressing changes in behaviour is time-based discounting of old experiences [2],
which ensures that newer experiences gain a greater weight in decision-making.
While this does mean that bad behaviour is reflected in the actor’s reputation
value somewhat faster, an increase in reaction speed also directly increases the
speed in which old information is lost — and any old transgressions forgotten.
Simulation experiments, used for comparing reputation metrics (e.g. [10, 4]),
commonly assume consistent behaviour from both the well-behaved actors and
any attackers. While it is quite reasonable to expect that an attacker intelligently
adjusts its behaviour to the policies in place, the simulated attacker behaviour
that we have observed so far is far from optimal. It is revealing that the most
simple baseline attack against reputation systems, one where an attacker first
gains reputation through good behaviour and then uses it up with bad behaviour,
is dubbed the “disturbing” attacker model by Schlosser et al. [10]. The name
reflects how poorly the compared systems could handle strategic changes in
behaviour. Our proposal directly addresses this issue.
A promising example of related work, TrustGuard, proposes a reputation
calculation formula which can react to incongruity [11]. In the model, decisions
on a given actor are based on a trust value calculated as a weighted sum of three
factors: 1) the current experiences, i.e. reports received in a given time period, 2)
the (optionally weighted) average of accumulated experiences overall, and 3) a
“derivative” of the current reports, representing whether there has been a recent
change for the better or worse in the reported experiences.
The TrustGuard model is one-dimensional: it assumes the experience report
values are real numbers between 0 and 1, and the result is a single real number.
The Pilarcos model, in contrast, is multidimensional, with reputation represented
as a vector of observed outcomes in relation to different assets and a set of
certainty measures. In other words, the trust score alone does not fix the decision.
TrustGuard has no concept of certainty; the calculated trust value is the
sole basis of a trust decision. The first factor represents the idea that current
experiences should be emphasized in the decision. However, as other time-based
discounting systems, it discounts all other information equally, independent of
their information content or context. The second, accumulated average factor
5can emphasize the time-based discounting, or treat stored experiences equally.
The derivative, on the other hand, could capture sudden changes in behaviour.
The larger the change, the larger the derivative value. Given a high weight, the
factor could speed up reaction to a current drastic change considerably. On the
other hand, it would equally strongly reward any change for the better, partially
overriding even the accumulated reputation or lack thereof. Information about
past changes in behaviour is not retained.
A few other reputation systems introduce certainty measures for the result-
ing decision. For example REGRET [9] defines a certainty measure based on the
amount of information used, the variation in experience values, the subjective
confidence of the recommender in the information they give, and social relation-
ships. If the certainty of the calculated reputation value is too low, the model
includes an option for calculating reputation using different approaches, such as
falling back from actor-specific experiences to the reputation of the social group
the actor belongs to. The amount of information stored is tracked also by e.g.
Travos [12]. SECURE, on the other hand, equates certainty with the particu-
larity of information [1]: it defines trust values as ranges between 0 and 1, and
the wider the range is, the less certainty there is, as it excludes fewer values as
incorrect.
Pilarcos has a computational measure for the degree of certainty [7]. As a
result, specific trust decisions can be identified as needing human attention.
We can also take advantage of knowing how inconsistent an actor’s behaviour
has been in the past. If an actor changes its behaviour all the time without
a discernible pattern, a reputation system should be able to detect that the
information it has is insufficient for the task at hand — it cannot predict the
unpredictable actor’s future behaviour.
The option to selectively involve an external human actor based on certainty
is generally not used in existing reputation systems, which are designed to either
be fully autonomous or to only provide supporting information for a human
decision-maker [8]. Even for a fully automated system, certainty could be used
for activating further levels of computation, such as REGRET does. Indeed, it is
natural to divide decision processes in partially supervised systems to multiple
levels as well, with a human intervention as the last option if other attempts fail.
We have discussed different levels of policy in earlier work [7].
3 Tracking changes with reputation epochs
When analyzing experience and reputation information for decision-making, a
central concern is whether the information is up-to-date, i.e. describes the current
behaviour of the actor in question well enough to be useful in trying to predict its
future behaviour. When faced with ten positive experiences and two negative,
it can make quite a difference if the negative experiences are ancient and the
actor’s recent behaviour has been spotless, or if the good experiences are mostly
older and the two negative are the most recent experiences available of the actor.
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the reputation information model. Storing the ordering of experiences sets heavy
requirements on the way experiences are stored and processed: treating each
experience as a unique object with a timestamp, or with a position in a queue
of experience objects, creates large data structures, which take an increasing
time to process as the number of experiences grows. While a theoretical model
of reputation can accommodate for infinite amounts of experience information,
practical models must adapt to time constraints at decision-making time: either
information must be compressed, which loses information, or old experiences
must be purged after a while.
We have chosen to compress experience items into outcome counters. The
compression tradeoff loses timing information. The basic reputation data struc-
ture places equal weight to all experiences, independent of the time they were
gathered. While it would be possible to discount old information through e.g.
aging factors, we find that such methods in practice steadily lose information:
they form a kind of fixed-size window to the past. The main problem with fixed
windows, in turn, is that they cannot be easily adjusted at the time of the deci-
sion: data is already lost while it is gathered. For example, past transgressions
can be completely erased from such systems by simply flooding the network with
new experiences from low-value real transactions or false experiences produced
by colluding partners.
Considered against the goal of reacting to changes in behaviour, we find that
time is actually not the optimal measure for determining the weight or value of
a unit of experience at all. Instead, we should measure whether the experience
brings new information; something we did not already know.
We propose to divide reputation information into reputation epochs, groups
of abstract periods of a given type of behaviour. While the latest turn of be-
haviour is the most interesting, it is also typical that there is very little expe-
rience on it; hence information from older epochs should also be included. The
weight given to the current epoch determines the speed in which the system
reacts to changes in behaviour. As an example, a pessimistic decision could even
be based on the worst ever observed behaviour. The number of epochs also pro-
vides a measure of the consistency of the trustee: if experiences on the trustee
are divided into a large and constantly increasing number of epochs, it indicates
that the trustee’s behaviour is not stable — or that it is not entirely fitting into
any behavioural categories the system can detect.
While reputation epochs do allow us to give less weight to old information,
they are superior to time-based constant discounting in two aspects: First, as
epochs are based on behaviour changes rather than strict time periods, they
fit the purpose of detecting when information is outdated in the sense of not
being useful for predicting future behaviour. Second, the weighing policy between
new and old information can be dynamically changed, and as no information is
actually discarded, the oldest experiences remain available for later analysis: the
reputation system can be configured to never forget anything without straining
the time-constrained decision-making process.
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therefore be processed in real time. It is also possible to set up epoch pruning
processes that ensure the number of distinctly stored epochs remains under con-
trol. For example, if it turns out that an actor’s behaviour regularly fluctuates
between two types of epochs, older epochs can be regularly merged, as the fluc-
tuations then actually represent a different type of consistent behaviour in the
long term.
4 Detecting changes in service performance
As a baseline risk tolerance policy, we will use a simple additive policy that gives
more weight to negative than positive outcomes (by a factor of 3), and further
weight on major effects as opposed to minor effects (another factor of 3) [7].
As an example, an actor with 10 experiences stored, of which 4 represent major
positive outcomes, 2 minor positive, 2 minor negative and 1 major negative,
would receive a trust score of (4 ∗ 3) + 2 + 2 ∗ (−3) + 1 ∗ (−3) ∗ 3 = −1. We
set the trust score threshold for a positive decision to 0, so this would result
in a negative decision. Changes in behaviour are then addressed through epoch
change policies: for simplicity, our simulations will use only the current epoch to
calculate this trust score.
In the general case, detecting changes between reputation epochs can be ap-
proached through the reasonably well-studied problem of anomaly detection [13].
Anomaly detection algorithms are often based on an example set of “normal”
values learned from earlier data, which are used to form a model of normal
behaviour; anything deviating from the model is then an anomaly.
In more specific cases, even quite simple epoch change policies can be suitable.
We present two example policies to achieve two different goals:
Load balancing: a service provider usually provides good service, but occa-
sionally the service quality varies depending on the number of incoming re-
quests. The first example policy should quickly react to a drop in the quality
of service, as it also indicates a need for load balancing.
Oscillation detection: a service provider oscillates between good and mali-
cious behaviour: first it collects good reputation, then it cuts corners in as
many service transactions as it can. Whenever there is a fixed decision pol-
icy in use that is known or can be deduced by experimenting, the optimal
attacker targeting the reputation system will collect just enough positive
reputation to not be shut out of the community, which makes this kind of
behaviour relevant to address. The second example policy should quickly
react to this kind of change for the worse, but also take advantage of the
service returning to normality.
In the load balancing example, we apply a simple dynamically learning algo-
rithm: a window of n previous experiences is stored by the epoch change detector,
and whenever a new experience falls outside the values present in the existing
filled window, a new epoch is created. As normal service quality is indicated by
8the vast majority of experiences, the window is typically filled with such expe-
riences. At the first drop in reputation, a new epoch and a new, empty learning
window are created. While the disturbance goes on, the window is filling up
with negative (or less positive) experiences. During this learning phase, when
the epoch contains less than n experiences, new epochs are not created. In our
simulations in the following section, we set n = 10.
If the window (n) is set to be shorter than a typical disturbance, it will be
full of negative experiences by the time the service returns to normal load, and
a new epoch is started when the first positive experience arrives. This leads to a
swift return to the service provider when it is no longer overloaded. For a more
pessimistic, slow recovery, the window (n) can be chosen to be longer than a
typical disturbance, which means that reputation is slowly regained within the
newest epoch. Again, once the window fills up with normal experiences, the first
sign of a negative experience causes a new epoch to be started. A limitation of
this policy is that if the experiences indicating normal or overloaded states have
some natural variation, new epochs may be created too easily.
In the oscillation detection example, the difference between good and mali-
cious behaviour is simple to observe, as the experiences will be polarized: positive
or negative. To allow greater variation in behaviour than the previous policy, we
apply a static, specification-based epoch detection algorithm. We define two be-
haviour profiles: “good” and “evil”. The good profile covers positive experiences,
the evil profile negative. Neutral experiences, or those representing unknown out-
comes, fall in neither category.
Given these profiles, we define each ongoing epoch to be either good or evil,
and the epoch changes if an incoming experience matches the opposite profile
rather than the current one. Neutral or unknown outcomes do not change the
epoch, as they match neither. Again, the ongoing epoch can in principle be given
full weight in decision-making. On the other hand, the attacker may respond by
oscillating on every service request: cooperate, defect, cooperate, defect. To with-
stand this kind of behaviour, the number of epochs or the number of experiences
in the current epoch should play a part in choosing a better weight division
between the current and previous epochs, or indicate that the decision should
really be delegated to a human user due to high uncertainty in the reputation
information.
The two above policies perform at their best when the central source of
reputation information is either first-hand experience, or a single highly credible
reputation network. On the other hand, sometimes experiences on an actor are
only available through a low-credibility reputation network, where there may be
errors in the experience information — either intentional misinformation or due
to e.g. differences in measurement standards. To cover this scenario, we extend
the oscillation detection case above with an additional requirement:
Conservative oscillation detection: a potentially oscillating service provider
is only known through a reputation network where some experience reports
are incorrect. The third example policy should be cautious in trusting rep-
9utation information that is out of the ordinary, and treat it as an outlier
unless it is backed up by additional information.
For this requirement, we apply the idea of sequential hypothesis testing [14],
which can be used to limit the probability of overreacting in anomaly detec-
tion [3].
In sequential hypothesis testing, a single experience out of the ordinary does
not yet change the epoch. It only strengthens the hypothesis that the epoch
should be changed, by a constant measure i; we set i = 1 for the purposes of
this text. Similarly, an experience supporting the current epoch weakens the
hypothesis by 1. Again, neutral and unknown experiences cause no effect. For
the epoch to change, either the change must amass support exceeding a given
threshold k, or during a period of t consecutive experiences there must be more
support for changing it than there has been for continuing the current epoch.
For our experiments in the following section, we set k = 5 and t = 10.
Combined to the oscillation detection policy, we get the following algorithm:
% I n i t i a l i z e and r e s e t suppor t and t imer v a r i a b l e s to 0 .
f o r each round :
i f expe r i ence and epoch match : % ( both good / both e v i l )
i f t imer == 0 :
sk ip to next round ;
e l s e :
support−−;
i f expe r i ence and epoch mismatch : % (one good , one e v i l )
support++;
t imer++;
i f support >= k :
change epoch ( ) ; % Overwhelming suppor t f o r change .
r e s e t v a r i a b l e s ( ) ;
i f support < 0 :
r e s e t v a r i a b l e s ( ) ;
i f t imer >= t :
i f support > 0 :
change epoch ( ) ; % Majori ty o f t vo t e s suppor t s i t .
r e s e t v a r i a b l e s ( ) ;
Sequential hypothesis testing can be similarly combined to the window-based
load balancing algorithm, to test the need to change epochs once the learning
window has been filled. However, this modification alone will not stop outliers
in incoming reputation information from being stored as examples of normal
behaviour during the learning process. Therefore, the algorithm would remain
vulnerable to any noise in reputation flows.
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5 Comparison of epoch detection policies
We illustrate the behaviour of the policies proposed in the previous section by
applying them to four scenarios with different experience input. These reputation
flows are manually constructed to illustrate the kind of a situation each policy is
designed to handle. For realistic applications, a combination of detection policies
is likely to be better suited than any specialized single policy.
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Fig. 1. Scenario 1: A change for the worse.
In the first scenario, a service behaves well (major positive experiences) for
the first half of the time period, then misbehaves (major negative experiences)
for the latter half; this situation could be caused e.g. by a service going per-
manently oﬄine, getting hacked or otherwise becoming untrustworthy. For a
traditional additive trust decision policy, its trust score (positives – negatives)
would remain positive to the end of this simulation, the trusting service suffer-
ing considerable losses during that time. As discussed in the previous section,
however, our baseline policy for comparison is already more strict: it gives more
weight (x3) to negative than positive experiences. Our threshold for a positive
trust decision is set to 0, i.e. when the calculated trust score drops below 0, trust
decisions become negative.
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The plots only follow the trust score calculated from the current epoch. As
seen in Fig. 1, the two first epoch detection algorithms (Load balancing and Os-
cillation detection) react instantaneously to a change in behaviour; their trust
scores are equal. The more conservative version of oscillation detection follows
closely behind; the sequential hypothesis tester waits until 5 consequtive evi-
dences of the change in behaviour have arrived, then triggers an epoch change.
The baseline algorithm, on the other hand, patiently waits until the old good
experiences are “used up” before turning negative. Even though it gives triple
weight to negative experiences, it lags behind the epoch change policies in reac-
tion speed (by 17 rounds).
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Fig. 2. Scenario 2: A need for load balancing.
In the second scenario, the monitored service generally behaves well (major
positive experiences), but suffers two drops in service quality due to overload —
at rounds 20 and 50, the flow outputs minor negative experiences to reflect e.g.
a slow response time. The first disturbance lasts for 10 rounds, after which the
service recovers. The second disturbance is less predictable, with two minor pos-
itive experiences arriving in the middle of it — in other words, the response time
was reasonable, but the service had not actually recovered and was congested
again soon after. The scenario is depicted in Fig. 2.
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Using the baseline policy, the service has a positive trust score throughout
the simulation. The weight on negative experiences is cancelled out due to their
lesser impact: positive experiences are major, while the service quality drops
produce minor negative experiences.
The epoch detection policies react quickly to the first outage; again, the Load
balancing and Oscillation detection algorithms behave the same way for the
first service quality drop, and immediately recover as service quality returns to
normal. In the second disturbance, however, the 10-round-long learning window
of the Load balancing policy is only filling up when the temporary recovery
occurs, and it does not change epochs in the middle of its learning phase. On
the other hand, the Oscillation detection algorithm reacts somewhat too quickly
to the temporary change to positive. As before, the Conservative oscillation
detection algorithm reacts with a delay while it accumulates evidence of the
change; the inconsistency during the second disturbance simply delays its epoch
change by two rounds.
The third scenario represents the “disturbing” behaviour pattern [10], an ac-
tor who oscillates between good and bad: the service collects just enough good
reputation to not be shut out of the system when it denies service. This can
also be interpreted as an opportunistic or “lazy” service provider who is ready
to violate contracts to cut costs, but takes care to not burn up its reputation
entirely. The length of the different oscillation phases is optimized for a given
trust decision policy. In the case of our baseline policy, it behaves well 75% of the
time (minor positive experiences), and misbehaves 25% of the time (minor neg-
ative experiences); as a result, its trust score is never negative with the baseline
policy. This scenario is depicted in Fig. 3 on the next page.
The Oscillation detection and Load balancing algorithms react immediately
to the first transgression. Their differences become apparent when the quality
of service increases again: The policy optimized for regular oscillation changes
the epoch in order to take advantage of the period of good service, up until the
next disturbance. Meanwhile, due to the shortness of the period of low service
quality (8 rounds), the Load balancing algorithm is still in its learning phase
when the change for better occurs; it only changes epoch at the next drop in
service quality. By then its window has filled with positive experiences (at round
56), and the current epoch’s reputation has just climbed to zero, resulting in a
mirror plot of the baseline policy. Finally, the Conservative oscillation detection
algorithm’s reactions are slightly delayed versions of those observed for the basic
Oscillation detection.
The strategic oscillation presented here is only an optimal attack against the
baseline policy. The Oscillation detection policy would appear to severely dis-
courage misbehaviour, although it is also instantly forgiving. This combination
of epoch detection and trust decision policies is altogether only feasible as an
example to build on; it reacts too absolutely to a single negative or positive
experience.
In the fourth scenario, noise is introduced to a basic oscillation pattern, i.e.
experience reports which disagree with the norm. We expect this kind of pattern
13
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Fig. 3. Scenario 3: Oscillating behaviour.
to be more realistic than reputation flows consisting of unanimous agreement
between sources, which makes it interesting to see how the different policies can
handle it. The scenario is depicted in Fig. 4 on the next page. First, two neutral
experiences (“no effect”) interrupt a pattern of minor positive experiences. In
the second “oscillation cycle”, the series of minor negative experiences is inter-
rupted by two minor positive experiences. Finally, both the positive and negative
halves are affected, by three minor negatives on the positive side, and two major
positives on the negative side.
The Load balancing algorithm becomes somewhat unstable in this scenario.
It reacts to the introduction of neutral experiences in round 12; due to its full
learning window not containing any of them from before, it is the only policy
strongly affected by this kind of noise. It changes epochs again when the negative
half of the oscillation begins, and again at the second drop in service quality.
During the second drop, minor positive experiences are introduced in the learn-
ing window, and therefore the policy does not change epochs at the third rise,
but only at the third drop — which, ironically, zeroes out the already negative
trust score before it drops again. A final epoch change is introduced as the last
oscillation cycle turns downwards. Similarly, the Oscillation detection algorithm
reacts strongly to every change in behaviour except the neutral experiences,
zigzagging between positive and negative trust scores.
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Fig. 4. Scenario 4: Oscillating behaviour with noise.
The Conservative oscillation detection policy endures the introduced noise,
and only changes epochs once per each longer change in behaviour. It first devi-
ates from the baseline policy once it has observed 5 minor negative experiences
in the first cycle; it similarly ignores the bumps in the second and third cycle.
The cost of this stability is the same as observed in all these scenarios: a slightly
delayed reaction to changes, as the algorithm awaits for supporting evidence.
6 Conclusion
An important strength of reputation-based trust management, as opposed to
more static, certification-based trust management, is in its ability to adjust to
changes in behaviour. This strength has gone underutilized in the past, as pro-
posed reputation systems provide quite limited means of detecting or reacting
to incongruity in reputation information.
In contrast, the epoch-aware reputation model we have proposed provides
the necessary flexibility for our trust management system to adjust to constantly
changing business situations.
A central design cornerstone has been to keep separate the policies for up-
dating reputation information, and making decisions based on it: this allows us
to use the same reputation data in multiple decision contexts, without having
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to collect it repeatedly. As a logical extension, we also separate the detection of
behaviour changes, i.e. epoch change policies, from the reaction to such changes,
i.e. policies on weighing different epochs and detecting when behaviour is too
inconsistent to warrant an automated decision. The first process is governed by
reputation update policies, and the latter by trust decision policies.
Trust management for inter-enterprise collaboration is inherently policy-
driven; it must be designed to be reconfigured at runtime as the need arises.
As Pilarcos is a general inter-enterprise collaboration management infrastruc-
ture, it must be able to cater for very different needs. We have demonstrated in
this paper how different scenarios warrant different approaches, and proposed
suitable policies for four example scenarios. These scenarios also demonstrate
the expressive power of the epoch concept; it can be adjusted according to the
situation, while for example time-based discounting can only be set up once.
Addressing changes in the behaviour of external sources of reputation in-
formation remains an important item of future work. Spreading misinformation
into reputation networks must have a negative impact on the source’s own rep-
utation. To fulfil this requirement, we are currently researching contractually
governed reputation systems based on objective, verifiable experiences.
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